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The great global warming debate has, for many years, cen-
tered on whether the phenomenon indeed exists. The idea that
human-produced greenhouse gases ("GHGs")1 were causing a rise
in atmospheric temperature was subject to great scientific uncer-
tainty. Yet after years of study and debate on the issue, scientists
and policymakers have reached a consensus that global warming
is occurring. 2 While acceptance of the urgent need to reduce
* J.D. Candidate 2007, Pace University School of Law; B.A. Middlebury College.
The following article is an update of a previously published article entitled Statutory
Void, Common Law Remedy: A Case for Federal Common Law in the Regulation of
Carbon Dioxide, N.Y. Envtl. Law., Fall 2006, at 5.
1. Greenhouse gases ("GHGs") affect global temperature. Naturally occurring
GHGs include water vapor, carbon dioxide ("C0 2"), methane ("CH 4"), nitrous oxide("N 20"), and ozone ("03"). Human activities increase the levels of these gases. Sulfur
hexafluoride ("SF 6 "), hydrofluorocarbons ("HFCs"), hydrochlorfluorocarbons
("HCFCs"), chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs"), and perfluorocarbons ("PFCs") are non-C02
synthetic gases produced exclusively by industrial activity. CO 2 from fossil fuel com-
bustion accounts for the largest percentage (59% in the year 2000) of global GHG
emissions. KEVIN BAUMERT & JONATHAN PERSHING, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE DATA: INSIGHTS AND OBSERVATIONS 5 fig.2, 6 (2004), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/policy-center/reports. For a list of all chemically reactive
and synthetic GHGs, see D. Ehhalt et al., Atmospheric Chemistry and Greenhouse
Gases, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP I TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC") 239, 244-45 tbls.4.1(a), 4.1(b) (John T. Houghton et al. eds.,
2001), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc-tar/wgl/pdf/TAR-04.PDF [here-
inafter Ehhalt, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001].
2. The international community has largely accepted the scientific causes and
effects of global warming. The IPCC, an international panel comprised of several
hundred academic scientists and researchers, synthesizes information from
thousands of peer reviewed and published technical literature to assess the current
status of climate change. So far, the IPCC has produced three comprehensive scien-
tific assessment reports indicating that most of the warming observed over the last
fifty years is attributable to human activities which have increased the atmospheric
237
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GHGs-specifically carbon dioxide ("C0 2")-is quickly unfolding
on the national radar screen, so too is an even hotter global warm-
ing debate. Centered on a more political issue, the question of
who should regulate carbon dioxide-the states, the judiciary, or
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")-has spurred argu-
ment across the country. Recently, this question has resulted in
litigation 3 and has even found its way to the United States Su-
preme Court.4
The answer is not an easy one, though, because the federal
government presently does not regulate CO 2 emissions and insists
on voluntary reduction measures instead.5 For example, the Ky-
oto Protocol 6 went into effect without the United States' participa-
tion,7 the Bush administration opposes placing binding limits on
greenhouse gas emissions s and the EPA denies any statutory au-
concentration of GHGs. The IPCC will publish its Fourth Assessment Report in 2007
at http://www.ipcc.ch. "The unresolved questions concern the pace and extent of fu-
ture warming and the impact on wildlife, agriculture, disease, local weather and the
height of the world's oceans." Andrew C. Revkin, Yelling "Fire" on a Hot Planet, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006, § 4, at 1.
3. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S.
Ct. 2960 (2006) (court deferred to EPA's decision to not regulate GHGs emitted by
new motor vehicles); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (court dismissed claim as non-jusiticiable political question when
eight states sued under the federal common law of public nuisance to enjoin five
power companies from emitting unreasonable contributions of CO 2 into the
atmosphere).
4. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Massachusetts v. EPA
on June 26, 2006. See Massachusetts, 126 S. Ct. at 2960. Most relevant to this Com-
ment is the second question presented: "Whether the EPA Administrator has author-
ity to regulate carbon dioxide and other air pollutants associated with climate change
under [Clean Air Act] section 202(a)(1)." Supreme Court of the United States, http:ll
www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-01120qp.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
5. See infra notes 47-77 and accompanying text.
6. The Kyoto Protocol is a treaty made under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCC"). Under the Protocol, 164 countries agreed
to reduce their emissions of carbon dioxide and other GHGs. See Kyoto Protocol to the
UNFCC, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. The United States, however, was
not one of these countries. See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (resolution passed 95-0
in the United States Senate requesting that the executive branch not sign the Kyoto
Protocol unless developing countries committed to emissions reductions and the Pro-
tocol was shown not to cause serious harm to the U.S. economy).
7. See Miguel Bustillo, Kyoto Pact Takes Effect Without U.S., L.A. TIMES, Feb.
16, 2005, at A3.
8. Juliet Eilperin, U.S. Won't Join in Binding Climate Talks; Administration
Agrees to Separate Dialogue, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2005, at A01; Andrew C. Revkin,
U.S., Under Fire, Eases its Stance in Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at Al.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss1/10
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thority to regulate CO 2 under the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). 9 Despite
these present regulatory positions, a majority of scholars believe
that the answer is simple: the EPA has the authority to regulate
C0 2 emissions, and consequently federal courts are not the proper
forum to issue such policies. 10 In brief, they find support in the
CAA's broad definition of "air pollutant," which by inference would
include C0 2 emissions.1 1 Because the CAA delegates to the EPA
the authority to control emissions which cause or contribute to air
pollution, endanger public welfare, and result from numerous or
diverse mobile or stationary sources, 12 these scholars claim that
the EPA logically has the authority to regulate CO 2 emissions.
Thus, they presume that federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear
federal common law actions demanding regulation of CO 2 emis-
sions because, like the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
("Clean Water Act" or "CWA") 13 in the area of water pollution, the
CAA "occupies the field" and thus preempts federal common law
in the area of air pollution.
This Comment challenges the presumption that the CAA
preempts federal common law in the area of air pollution and
maintains that Congress never intended for the EPA to regulate
CO 2 emissions through the CAA. 14 Specifically, through a textual
and structural analysis of the CAA, as well as a close examination
of the requirements for preemption under City of Milwaukee v. II-
9. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,925 (Sept. 8, 2003); Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q)
(2000).
10. See, e.g., Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Defending Overstatement: The Symbolic
Clean Air Act and Carbon Dioxide, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 99 (2006); Janine Maney,
Comment, Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Climate Change, and the Clean Air Act: An
Analysis of Whether Carbon Dioxide Should be Listed as Criteria Pollutant, 13 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 298 (2005); Daniel V. Mumford, Note, Curbing Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Through the Rebirth of Public Nuisance Laws-Environmental Legislation by the
Courts, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 195 (2005). But see ARNOLD W.
REITZE, JR., ENvTL. LAW INST., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE AND EN-
FORCEMENT 413 (2001); Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Global Warming as a
Public Nuisance: Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV.
407 (2005).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (defining "air pollutant," in relevant part, as "any air pol-
lution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biologi-
cal, radioactive ... substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the
ambient air").
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A)-(B).
13. Federal Water Pollution Control Act ( "Clean Water Act" or "CWA"), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (2000).
14. See infra notes 131-53 and accompanying text.
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linois,15 this Comment demonstrates that the CAA does not pre-
empt actions of federal common law public nuisance to regulate
CO2. As such, federal courts should be recognized as proper fo-
rums for such suits. This Comment does not argue that global
warming satisfies the elements of a public nuisance or other con-
stitutional tests such as those for standing and ripeness. Rather,
the federal common law of public nuisance should constitute a
valid foot in the courtroom door for plaintiffs seeking practical and
efficient means to thwart a known and recognized threat. In the
absence of an adequate statutory remedy, plaintiffs should have
access to injunctive relief.16 The United States is the only unregu-
lated source of CO 2 in the developed world,' 7 and its growing emis-
sions continue to cross state boundaries.18 To forestall the
forecast of significant environmental damage from global warm-
ing,19 federal common law is an available and "necessary expedi-
ent" to impose caps on C0 2 -at least until comprehensive,
regulatory carbon dioxide legislation is passed.20
This Comment proceeds in five more sections. Section II
highlights the United States' contribution to greenhouse gas emis-
sions and then provides a scientific overview of the causes and ef-
fects of global warming. Section III describes the main obstacle to
effective mitigation-the lack of any federal initiative to place
mandatory caps on CO 2. Section IV discusses the doctrine of pre-
emption and how it relates to the federal common law of public
nuisance. Section V argues that the CAA, as currently amended,
does not preempt the federal common law of public nuisance in a
sovereign's suit to impose limits on C0 2 emissions. Section VI
concludes.
15. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee I/), 451 U.S. 304 (1981); see also in-
fra notes 174-84 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 185-99 and accompanying text.
17. See Pawa & Krass, supra note 10, at 414.
18. See infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 28-46 and accompanying text.
20. See Milwaukee H, 451 U.S. at 313-14 ("[Federal common law] is resorted to 'in
absence of an applicable Act of Congress,' and because the Court is compelled to con-
sider federal questions 'which cannot be answered from federal statutes alone.' Fed-
eral common law is a 'necessary expedient."' (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Status of the Union
From 1990-2000, the United States contributed the largest
percentage of CO 2 from fossil fuels internationally, emitting 24.1%
of the world's anthropogenic CO 2 .21 In comparison, the European
Union, China, and Russia contributed 16.0%, 14.5%, and 6.4% of
CO 2 from fossil fuels, respectively. 22 Even when all forms of GHG
emissions are combined, the United States was still the largest
source of GHG emissions, contributing 15.8% of global emis-
sions. 23 Since 2000, these domestic emissions of GHGs have con-
tinued to rise. In 2004, the United States emitted 7122.1 million
metric tons of anthropogenic GHGs, which was 2% greater than in
2003 and 16% greater than in 1990.24 The United States Depart-
ment of Energy found that of the total United States GHG emis-
sions in 2004, 82.4% consisted of CO 2 from fossil fuel
combustion. 25 Despite these significant and ongoing contributions
to global emissions, only local and state authorities have re-
sponded with regulatory initiatives to reduce domestic emission of
GHGs and CO 2 in particular. 26 Comparing this federal inaction to
21. BAUMERT & PERSHING, supra note 1, at 23 tbl.3. As distinguished from natu-
rally occurring CO 2, anthropogenic CO2 is a direct result of human-generated activi-
ties such as fossil fuel combustion. See A.P.M. Baede et al., The Climate System: An
Overview, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORK-
ING GROUP I TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 85, 92 (John T. Hough-
ton et al. eds., 2001), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc%5Ftar/wgl/pdf]
TAR-01.PDF [hereinafter Baede, CLIMATE CHANGE 20011. For the purposes of this
comment, CO2 will always refer to anthropogenic CO 2.
22. BAUMERT & PERSHING, supra note 1, at 23 tbl.3.
23. Id.
24. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., OFFICE OF INTEGRATED ANALYSIS & FORECASTING, U.S.
DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA REP. No. 0573(2004), EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES
IN THE UNITED STATES 2004 ix (2005), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/
gg05rpttpdf/057304.pdf [hereinafter 2004 REPORT].
25. This figure was calculated after adjusting for United States territories and
international bunker fuels. See id. at ix-x. In 2004, the United States economy grew
by 4.2%, the highest rate of growth since 1999, though GHG emissions per unit of real
economic output decreased by 2.1%. Id. at ix. In the same year, 1.5% of total United
States GHG emissions included CO2 from non-combustion sources such as methane
(9%), nitrous oxide (5%), and other gases (2.2%). Id. at x.
26. In December 2005, seven states from the Northeast signed a Memorandum of
Understanding to implement the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the first
mandatory market-based cap-and-trade program to stabilize and reduce CO 2 emis-
sions from power plants. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Homepage, http:/!
www.rggi.org/index.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). For a review of other significant
state and local responses to mitigate the effects of global warming, see David R.
Hodas, State Law Responses to Global Warming: Is it Constitutional to Think Globally
and Act Locally?, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 53 (2003); Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Labora-
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the "steady drumbeat" of state regulation, one scholar remarked
that "it is as though we live in two different countries."27
B. Global Warming Overview
Without GHGs, the Earth would be very cold. 28 The inherent
presence of GHGs in the environment initiates a natural green-
house effect by trapping heat and warming the Earth's surface
and lower atmosphere. 29 Prior to the Industrial Revolution, the
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere remained relatively con-
stant.30 However, in the late eighteenth century, rapidly develop-
ing industry began to replace an economy previously dominated
by manual labor. As a result, the concentration of GHGs in the
atmosphere increased, which enhanced the greenhouse effect and
caused global average surface temperature to rise. 31 Most of this
collective warming occurred during the twentieth century, with
the 1990s recognized as the warmest decade of the millennium.32
In particular, the amount of CO 2 in the atmosphere rose by more
than 30% and is continuing to increase at an average rate of 0.4%
per year, primarily due to fossil fuel combustion 33 and deforesta-
tories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local and Private Leadership in
Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN
ST. ENvTL. L. REV. 15 (2004); Barry G. Rabe, Mikael Roman, & Arthur N. Dobelis,
State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 1 (2005).
27. Hodas, supra note 26, at 53.
28. ToM M.L. WIGLEY, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SCIENCE OF
CLIMATE CHANGE: GLOBAL AND U.S. PERSPECTIVES 4 (1999), available at http:l!
www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/env%5Fscience%2Epdf.
29. Id.
30. Baede, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001, supra note 21, at 92.
31. Id. at 93. This is called "radiative forcing," which the IPCC explains as
follows:
The increased concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere en-
hances the absorption and emission of infrared radiation. The atmos-
phere's opacity increases so that the altitude from which the Earth's
radiation is effectively emitted into space becomes higher. Because the
temperature is lower at higher altitudes, less energy is emitted, causing a
positive radiative forcing.
Id.
32. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BAsIs, CONTRIBUTION OF WORK-
ING GROUP I TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 2 (John T. Houghton et
al. eds., 2001), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcctar/wgl/pdf/WGlTAR-
FRONT.PDF [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 2001]; Baede, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001,
supra note 21, at 102.
33. See 2004 REPORT, supra note 24, at xii (finding that the consumption of energy
from the combustion of fossil fuels is the single largest contributor to anthropogenic
GHG emissions in the United States).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss1/10
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tion.34 The global average surface temperature 35 likewise in-
creased by 0.6 0C ± 0.20 C36 and air temperature increased 0.1°C
per decade in the lowest eight kilometers of the atmosphere.3 7
The average sea level has risen by 0.1 to 0.2 meters as well. 38
This, however, is not an exhaustive list of documented changes; all
of the Earth's resources are affected by global warming.
The release of GHGs has primary and secondary effects on
the environment and human health and welfare.39 The primary
effect is global warming, a phenomenon whereby warmer surface
and air temperatures alter ocean currents and air circulation,
thus affecting weather patterns. 40 A non-exhaustive list of secon-
dary effects includes: reduced water for irrigation and hydroelec-
tric power; crop damage from insects, disease, and drought;
increases in soil salinity; loss of wetlands; loss of wildlife species
and habitat; the spread of infectious disease among humans; and
an increased demand for electricity for air conditioning. 41 Other
predicted large-scale and high-impact effects include: most fa-
mously, the melting of mountain glaciers and ice sheets, which
would destroy coastal habitats and increase the salinity of wet-
lands, estuaries, and aquifers; an increased frequency of extreme
weather, 42 including higher maximum temperatures, more hot
days and heat waves, and fewer cold days and frost days, which
would cause damage to livestock and agriculture; and more in-
34. Deforestation is particularly problematic because forests are repositories of
CO 2, containing approximately two-thirds of the total amount of CO2 present in the
atmosphere. When entire forests are cut down, all of the CO 2 stored within the plants
is released. See REITZE, supra note 10, at 413.
35. CLIMATE CHANGE 2001, supra note 32, at 2 (defining "global average surface
temperature" as "the average of near surface air temperature over land and sea sur-
face temperature").
36. Id.
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id. at 4.
39. REITZE, supra note 10, at 414.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. In light of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which destroyed the Gulf Coast in
the late summer of 2005, there is great speculation as to whether global warming is at
least partly responsible for an increase in severe weather activity. See Jeffrey Kluger,
Global Warming: The Culprit? Evidence Mounts that Human Activity is Helping Fuel
These Monster Hurricanes, TIME, Oct. 3, 2005, at 40. Such conjecture is not unsub-
stantiated according to the United States government. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S.
CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2002 100-01 (2002), available at http://www.gcrio.org/
CAR2002/ [hereinafter CLIMATE ACTION REPORT] ("Although projections of the num-
ber of hurricanes that may develop remain uncertain, model simulations indicate
that, in a warmer climate, hurricanes that do develop are likely to have higher wind
speeds and produce more rainfall.").
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tense precipitation events, which would increase floods, land-
slides, mudslides, and soil erosion. 43
Although uncertainty surrounding the magnitude of the ef-
fects of global warming still lingers, studies supporting the above
predictions are quite compelling. The latest data from a two-mile
long ice core sample taken from Antarctica indicates that carbon
dioxide levels are 27% higher today than they were 650,000 years
ago. 44 Because humans will continue to demand energy from oil,
coal, and natural gas sources and because the use of fossil fuels
increases proportionately with economic growth,45 it is unlikely
that unregulated C0 2 emissions will significantly decrease in the
near future.46
III. OBSTACLES TO THE REGULATION OF
CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS: THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT
A. The Executive Branch
The United States government is not entirely to blame for its
failure to regulate C0 2 emissions. Recent presidents have re-
sponded to growing international concern about the impact of
GHGs by signing international treaties to either stabilize or re-
duce emissions. 47 The current administration, however, will not
43. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY,
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC
7 tbl.SPM-1 (James J. McCarthy et al. eds., 2001), available at http://www.grida.no/
climate/ipcc-tar/wg2/pdf/wg2TARspm.pdf [hereinafter IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND
VULNERABILITY].
44. Usha Lee McFarling, Core Evidence That Humans Affect Climate Change; Ice
Drilled in Antarctica Offers the Fullest Record of Glacial Cycles and Greenhouse Gas
Levels, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2005, at A24. For the actual study cited by this news
article, see Urs Siegenthaler et al., Stable Carbon Cycle- Climate Relationship During
the Late Pleistocene, 310 SCIENCE 1313 (2005).
45. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 42, at 8.
46. Juliet Eilperin, World Leaders to Discuss Strategies for Climate Control; Bush
Administration Shuns Conference On Strategies to Build on Kyoto Pact, WASH. POST,
Nov. 27, 2005, at A03 ("'We do have a little time, but not much.... If we don't get a
serious program in place for the long term in this second post-Kyoto phase, we will
simply not make it and we will be crossing limits which will basically produce impacts
that are unacceptable.'" (quoting Michael Oppenheimer, Princeton University
scientist)).
47. In 1992, President George H.W. Bush signed the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC'). The objective of this framework conven-
tion was the "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate sys-
tem." United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. Presi-
[Vol. 24244
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consider binding emissions legislation. President Bush recognizes
global warming as a major national and international environ-
mental problem, 48 but he has unambiguously declared his opposi-
tion to any regulation of CO2 emissions. 49 In a letter to Senators
Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts, he wrote, "I do not believe,
however, that the government should impose on power plants
mandatory emissions reductions for carbon dioxide, which is not a
'pollutant' under the Clean Air Act."50 Likewise, during the Mon-
treal Climate Conference in December 2005, the chief American
negotiator actually walked out of informal discussions regarding
long-term international cooperation to carry out the United Na-
tions' 1992 treaty on climate change. 5' The United States eventu-
ally consented to "open and nonbinding" talks, but it has yet to
agree to any formal commitment. 52 Despite this clear opposition
to regulation, the Bush administration's budget does include fund-
ing for a variety of climate research and other initiatives designed
to reduce GHGs.5 3 For example, in February 2003, the Depart-
ment of Energy launched Climate Voluntary Innovative Sector In-
itiatives: Opportunities Now ("VISION"), a program that helps
industry trade groups identify and implement cost-effective solu-
dent Bill Clinton then signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which amended the
UNFCCC and committed Annex I Parties to individual, legally-binding targets to
limit or reduce their GHG emissions. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6.
48. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Global Climate
Change Policy Book (Feb. 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/
climatechange.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
49. See Ray Moseley, Bush's Opposition to Clean-Air Accord Risky, Activists Say,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 22, 2001, at N3 (Bush stated, "I oppose the Kyoto Protocol."); see also
Peter Behr & Eric Pianin, Firms Start Trading Program for Greenhouse-Gas Emis-
sions; Creation of Exchange Expands Voluntary Effort to Cut Pollutants; Democrats
Push for Mandatory Controls, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2003, at A14 ("The Bush adminis-
tration opposes mandatory reduction in carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.
Instead, the president has called for more research on global warming and new eco-
nomic incentives to encourage utilities and manufacturers to gradually reduce the
growth of emissions.").
50. See Kyle Danish, Global Climate Change, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK
497 (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello eds., 2d ed. 2004).
51. Revkin, supra note 8.
52. Eilperin, supra note 8.
53. See generally The Climate Change Research Initiative, http://
www.climatescience.gov/about/ccri.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2006); President George
W. Bush, President Bush Announces Climate Change Initiatives (Jul. 13, 2001), http:/
/yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/webprintview/NewsandEventsSpeeches-
Bush-7-13-01.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006); see also Press Release, White House
Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 48 (including tax incentives and carbon
sequestration).
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tions to reduce GHG emissions.5 4 These voluntary C0 2 reduction
measures will not appreciably reduce the United States' contribu-
tion to global climate change alone; rather, actual regulation of
CO 2 is necessary.
55
B. The Legislative Branch
While Congress clearly recognizes the causal link between
CO 2 and global warming,5 6 it has not passed any legislation that
regulates CO 2.57 This may soon change, now that both houses are
controlled by Democrats eager to pass national legislation to re-
duce GHGs and slow global warming. Prior to 2007, bills intro-
duced with language to implement some sort of mandatory
program were either unable to garner enough votes in Congress or
remain sitting in congressional committees. In 2003, Senators
McCain (R-Ariz.) and Lieberman (D-Conn.) co-sponsored a bill en-
titled the Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 ("the McCain-Lieber-
man Bill").58 This bill would establish a comprehensive program
to regulate GHGs by reducing annual GHG emissions from
sources in the electricity, industrial, commercial, and transporta-
tion sectors to year-1990 levels by 2016.5 9 Furthermore, the bill
would allow regulated firms to meet their obligations through a
54. Climate VISION, Program Mission, http://www.climatevision.gov/mis-
sion.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Energy,
Office of Pub. Affairs, DOE Strengthens Public Registry to Track Greenhouse Gas
Emissions (April 17, 2006), available at http://www.pi.energy.gov/pdf/library/
1605BApril172006.pdf.
55. Although the Bush administration continues to cite a brief drop in emissions
after 2000 as evidence that voluntary reduction measures are indeed slowing the re-
lease of GHGs, evidence that domestic GHG emissions reached an all-time high in
2004 clearly contradicts these statements. See Andrew C. Revkin, Gas Emissions
Reached High in U.S. in '04, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2005, at A30 (referring to the 2004
REPORT, supra note 24) ("'[Ilt seems unlikely that the present U.S. strategy of only
setting emissions targets relative to economic growth, reducing so-called greenhouse
gas intensity, will be enough."' (quoting Lord Rees, president of the Royal Society, an
independent British scientific academy)).
56. Section 821 of the 1990 Amendments to the CAA is entitled "Information
gathering on greenhouse gases contributing to global climate changes." Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-549, § 821, 104 Stat. 2399, 2699 (1990) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7505-7671 (2000)).
57. Congress has expressed its concern by passing legislation urging voluntary
reduction. See Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, §§ 1101-
1106, 101 Stat. 1331, 1407-09 (1987) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (2000))
(declaring that "[n]ecessary actions must be identified and implemented in time to
protect the climate," but does not mandate reductions in CO 2 and GHG emissions).
58. S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003), as reprinted in 149 CONG. REC. 13572
59. Id.
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tradeable allowance program.60 After being rejected by the Sen-
ate 55-43 on October 30, 2003,61 the McCain-Lieberman Bill was
referred back to the Senate Committee on Environment and Pub-
lic Works and no action has occurred since.
Also in 2003 and again in 2005, Senator Jeffords (I-Vt.) intro-
duced bills entitled the Clean Power Acts of 2003 and 2005,62
which would amend the CAA to require the Administrator of the
EPA to promulgate regulations to achieve specified reductions in
C0 2, mercury, and other GHGs. 63 Because this bill never emerged
from committee, Senator Jeffords recently introduced another bill
that would amend the CAA to reduce emissions of CO 2.64 Jeffords'
Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, 65 is the most aggressive
regulatory bill to date as it "cover[s] nearly all sectors of the econ-
omy, including new and old power plants, automobiles, motor fu-
els and other major carbon-producing industries."66 Now that the
balance of power in Congress has swung to the left, this bill, or
perhaps other GHG legislation proposed in early 2007,67 might ac-
tually win a majority of votes.
C. The Environmental Protection Agency
In August 2003, Robert Fabricant, General Counsel to the
EPA, issued a memorandum withdrawing prior statements that
60. Id.
61. Id.; see also Editorial, Promising Vote on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2003, at A14 (reporting McCain's failure to persuade Republicans to move forward on
global warming).
62. The bill was first introduced in 2003 as S. 366. S. 366 was read twice then
referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works. See Clean Power Act of
2003, S. 366, 108th Cong. (2003). The Clean Power Act of 2003 was reintroduced in
January 2005 as S. 150. S. 150 met the same fate as S. 366, as it was read twice and
then referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works. See Clean Power
Act of 2005, S. 150, 109th Cong. (2005).
63. Clean Power Act of 2005, S. 150, 109th Cong. (2005).
64. See S. 3698, 109th Cong. (2006).
65. Id.
66. Darren Samuelsohn, Sen. Jeffords Takes Cover Off Global Warming Bill, E&E
NEWS PM, July 20, 2006, http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm2006/07/20/archive/6?
terms=jeffords (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
67. See, e.g., National Energy and Environmental Security Act of 2007, S. 6,
110th Cong. (2007); Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280, 110th
Cong. (2007); Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th Cong. (2007);
Electric Utility Cap and Trade Act of 2007, S. 317, 110th Cong. (2007); TEAM up for
Energy Independence Act, H.R. 182, 110th Cong. (2007); Climate Stewardship Act of
2007, H.R. 620, 110th Cong. (2007).
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the EPA had legal authority to regulate CO 268 and declared that
the CAA does not give the EPA regulatory power under the stat-
ute: "Because the CAA does not authorize regulation to address
climate change, it follows that CO 2 and other GHGs, as such, are
not air pollutants under the CAA's regulatory provisions, includ-
ing sections 108, 109, 111, 112, and 202."69 Less than one month
later the EPA incorporated Fabricant's legal analysis into a for-
mal rulemaking, denying any authority to regulate CO 2 emissions
from new motor vehicles because CO 2 is not an air pollutant under
the CAA.70 As the EPA is the primary agency charged with ad-
ministering the CAA, by declaring that it had no authority to reg-
ulate CO2, the EPA dealt a severe blow to any federal plaintiffs
statutory remedies which could potentially be used to compel the
agency to list CO 2 as a criteria pollutant. 71 Numerous states, cit-
ies, and environmental organizations sued the EPA on this very
issue, but the lower court relied on the Administrator's policy
judgments and deferred to the EPA's decision. 72 This case, Mas-
sachusetts v. EPA, is now before the United States Supreme
Court.
68. See Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, General Counsel, EPA, to Carol
M. Browner, Administrator, EPA (Apr. 10, 1998) (on file with Pace Environmental
Law Review).
69. Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, General Counsel, EPA, to Marianne
L. Horinko, Acting Administrator, EPA Region 10 (Aug. 28, 2003) (on file with Pace
Environmental Law Review).
70. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,925 (Sept. 8, 2003) ("After careful consideration of petitioners' arguments
and the public comments, EPA concludes that it cannot and should not regulate GHG
emissions from U.S. motor vehicles under the CAA. Based on a thorough review of
the CAA, its legislative history, other congressional action and Supreme Court prece-
dent, EPA believes that the CAA does not authorize regulation to address global cli-
mate change. Moreover, even if CO 2 were an air pollutant generally subject to
regulation under the CAA, Congress has not authorized the Agency to regulate CO 2
emissions from motor vehicles to the extent such standards would effectively regulate
car and light truck fuel economy, which is governed by a comprehensive statute ad-
ministered by DOT.").
71. The CAA is structured around the regulation of criteria air pollutants. Crite-
ria pollutants are a group of common air pollutants that are designated as such based
on their effects on public health and welfare. The six named criteria pollutants are
particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, ozone, and lead.
See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4-.12 (2006). The Administrator of the EPA must first
list a pollutant as an air pollutant before the EPA has the authority to regulate it. See
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (2000).
72. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S.
Ct. 2960 (2006).
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D. The Judicial Branch
As the Supreme Court has now accepted certiorari on the
question of whether the EPA has statutory authority to regulate
CO 2 under the CAA,73 the Court will likely uphold the lower court
and defer to the agency's discretion under the strong language of
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.74 In Chevron,
Justice Stevens invoked a two-prong test to determine whether an
agency's construction of a statute is proper: "First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."75 Where an
answer to the first inquiry results in a negative, however, Chevron
analysis proceeds to the second step: "If, however ... the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permis-
sible construction of the statute."76 One theoretical justification
for Chevron deference is based on agency expertise. As Justice
Scalia explained in a lecture at Duke Law School, because of an
agency's "intense familiarity with the history and purposes of the
legislation at issue [and its] practical knowledge of what will best
effectuate those purposes ... [an agency is] more likely than the
courts to reach the correct result."77
The United States government could choose to regulate C0 2,
but as evidenced above, no such initiative currently exists. Conse-
quently, because growing concentrations of unregulated CO 2 emis-
sions affect every state, the problem deserves federal attention in
federal courtrooms. Until Congress implements a comprehensive
regulatory program for C0 2, federal common law of public nui-
sance should remain a viable cause of action that produces a rem-
edy to impose limits on C0 2 emissions.
73. See id.
74. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
75. Id. at 842-43.
76. Id.
77. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 514 (1989).
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IV. PREEMPTION AND THE FEDERAL COMMON
LAW OF PUBLIC NUISANCE
A. The Doctrine of Preemption
Article VI, Clause Two of the United States Constitution de-
clares, "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land... any Thing in the Consti-
tution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. '" 78
Otherwise known as the Supremacy Clause, this declaration is the
origin of the doctrine of preemption. 79 Preemption generally re-
fers to the displacing effect that federal law will have on a conflict-
ing state law. Preemption may be either expressed or implied:
"Congress' [preemptive] command is explicitly stated in the stat-
ute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and pur-
pose."8 0 There are two forms of implied preemption: field
preemption and conflict preemption.8 1 Field preemption denotes a
scheme of federal regulation that is "so pervasive as to make rea-
sonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it."82
A classic example of field preemption as applied to the CWA83
is found in the related cases Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwau-
kee 1)84 and City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee i!).85 Before
the CWA was passed, the federal common law of public nuisance
existed as a viable cause of action to abate a nuisance caused by
water pollution. In Milwaukee I, the State of Illinois sued the City
of Milwaukee under the federal common law of public nuisance,
alleging that Milwaukee's two sewage treatment plants inade-
quately treated its sewage.8 6 When this sewage overflowed into
Lake Michigan, Illinois argued that these discharges posed a
threat to the health of its citizens.8 7 The Court in Milwaukee I
recognized the existence of federal common law as an available
remedy:
78. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
79. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992).
80. Id. at 98.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
84. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1), 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
85. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee I/), 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
86. Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 93.
87. Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. at 309.
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As the field of federal common law has been given necessary ex-
pansion into matters of federal concern and relationship (where
no applicable federal statute exists, as there does not here), the
ecological rights of a State in the improper impairment of them
from sources outside the State's own territory, now would and
should, we think, be held to be a matter having basis and stan-
dard in federal common law and so directly constituting a ques-
tion arising under the laws of the United States.8s
Yet, once Congress passed the CWA Amendments of 1972,
this new regulatory system, which explicitly prohibited the dis-
charge of pollutants into waters of the United States, effectively
nullified the need for a federal common law remedy. 9 The Court
in Milwaukee II held that "when Congress addresses a question
previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law
the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal
courts disappears.... Congress... has occupied the field through
the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program super-
vised by an expert administrative agency."90 In addition to pre-
empting common law water pollution, field preemption has
formed the basis for federal preemption in other important areas,
including nuclear safety, collective bargaining, and alien
registration.9 1
The second form of implied preemption is conflict preemption.
Conflict preemption denotes a scheme "'[in which] compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibil-
ity.' 92 Even in the absence of a direct conflict between state and
federal law, a conflict exists if the state law "stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."93
While Chief Justice Rehnquist held in Milwaukee II that the
Clean Water Act occupies the field of the federal common law of
88. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 99-100 (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240
(10th Cir. 1971)).
89. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000) (discharge of
a pollutant is illegal except in compliance with law).
90. Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. at 314, 317 (emphasis added).
91. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1983) (nuclear safety); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
471 U.S. 724, 750-51 (1985) (collective bargaining); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941) (registration of aliens).
92. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (quoting Fla.
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
93. Id.; Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
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water pollution, the Supreme Court has yet to determine: (1)
whether the CAA occupies the field of the federal common law of
interstate air pollution;94 and if so, (2) whether the CAA is sub-
stantially comprehensive to specifically preempt the federal com-
mon law of public nuisance in the regulation of C0 2.95 Before
explaining why the CAA does not preempt a federal common law
nuisance action with respect to C0 2, it is necessary to explore the
survival of federal common law and its application to public nui-
sance causes of action, post Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
96
B. The Federal Common Law of Public Nuisance
1. The Survival of Federal Common Law Post Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
Despite the landmark ruling handed down by the Supreme
Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins that there is no federal
general common law,97 a body of "specialized" federal common law
has survived.98 Before Erie was decided, courts were free to de-
velop law independently of state judicial decisions.99 Erie, how-
ever, nullified federal courts' ability to develop this independent
body of common law when it overruled Swift v. Tyson'00 and held
that "[t]here is no federal general common law."10' Conversely,
the very same day that Justice Brandeis decided Erie, he also rec-
ognized the vitality of federal common law in Hinderlider v. La
94. Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM J.
ENVTL. L. 293, 310 (2005).
95. Id. at 316-19.
96. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
97. Id. at 78; see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945) ("In
overruling Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, Erie... did not merely overrule a venerable case.
It overruled a particular way of looking at law which dominated the judicial process
long after its inadequacies had been laid bare."); Merrill, supra note 94, at 307 ("'Fed-
eral common law' on any conception, applies when important federal interests would
be frustrated by the application of state law. Federal common law is in effect a type of
preemption of state law.").
98. The term "specialized common law" was coined by Judge Henry Friendly in
his article In Praise of Erie and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV.
383, 405 (1964); see also Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 625 n.7
(1980); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv.
L. REV. 883, 909 (1986) ("The examples [of cases recognizing specialized common law]
reveal an extensive federal common law, of many different varieties, with no coherent
unifying principle, and whose current boundaries are uncertain.").
99. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842) (holding that the Rules of Decision Act
required that questions of a general nature, those not dependent on local law or local
statutory law, be determined by general principles of jurisprudence).
100. Id.
101. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added).
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Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. 102 Justice Brandeis wrote,
"For whether the water of an interstate stream must be appor-
tioned between the two States is a question of 'federal common
law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either
State can be conclusive. 1 0 3 Hinderlider laid the foundation for
the survival of a new, specialized kind of federal common law.
The idea of a specialized body of federal common law applies
"where there is an overriding federal interest in the need for uni-
form rule of decision or where the controversy touches basic inter-
ests of federalism."1 0 4 For example, the Supreme Court, in Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Electrical Cooperative, Inc., chose to apply federal law
over state law based on an overriding federal interest in having
the issue tried by a jury.10 5 As long as there is federal competence
to hear the issue, 10 6 a strong federal interest in the matter, and no
preemption by a statute, courts may apply federal common law.
Nonetheless, the instances in which a court may formulate federal
common law are extremely limited: "[F]ederal common law exists
only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and
obligations of the United States, interstate and international dis-
putes implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations
with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.1 0 7
Hinderlider established the modern framework for the federal
common law of public nuisance.10 8 Thirty-six years after Hinder-
lider was decided, Texas v. Pankey10 9 became the first environ-
mental public nuisance case to apply specialized federal common
law. In Pankey, the State of Texas sought to enjoin various ranch
102. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
103. Id. at 110.
104. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1), 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972).
105. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958) (holding that the
"strong federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relation-
ship in the federal courts" justified the application of a federal rule of decision).
106. Erie contemplated that in order for a court to choose federal law, the first
inquiry is whether the court has power to hear the case. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 ("Con-
gress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state
whether they be local in their nature or 'general'.... And no clause in the Constitu-
tion purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.").
107. Texas Indus., Inc, v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) ("In
these instances, our federal system does not permit the controversy to be resolved
under state law, either because the authority and duties of the United States as sov-
ereign are intimately involved or because the interstate or international nature of the
controversy makes it inappropriate for state law to control.").
108. See Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 105.
109. Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971), cited with approval by Mil-
waukee 1, 406 U.S. at 103, 107 n.9.
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owners in New Mexico from spraying a pesticide to eradicate
range caterpillars, alleging that the chemical polluted the up-
stream Canadian River, harmed its aquatic life, and impaired the
State's right to both enjoy the water and use it as a source of water
supply for eleven municipalities. 110 Because Texas chose to sue in
the District Court for the District of New Mexico rather than in
state court, the Tenth Circuit had to determine if the district court
had jurisdiction to hear the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a). Stating that Tennessee Copper would have applied fed-
eral common law if it were decided at present, the court ruled in
favor of Texas, holding that there is federal question jurisdiction
based on federal common law:
As the field of federal common law has been given necessary ex-
pansion into matters of federal concern and relationship (where
no applicable federal statute exists, as there does not here), the
ecological rights of a State in the improper impairment of them
from sources outside the State's own territory, now would and
should, we think, be held to be a matter having basis and stan-
dard in federal common law and so directly constituting a ques-
tion arising under the laws of the United States.11'
Many courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
have repeatedly recognized the Hinderlider and Pankey interpre-
tations of federal common law.1 12 In Milwaukee I, the Supreme
Court believed that federal common law was essential to the adju-
dication of the violation of a state's environmental rights by
outside sources.11 3 When Milwaukee If came before the Supreme
Court, although it held that the CWA preempted the federal com-
mon law of water pollution,1 1 4 the Court continued to acknowledge
the existence of a federal common law in specialized
circumstances:
When Congress has not spoken to a particular issue . . .and
when there exists a "significant conflict between some federal
policy or interest and the use of state law" . . . the Court has
110. Pankey, 441 F.2d at 237-38.
111. Id. at 240.
112. See, e.g., Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 108; Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d
492 (8th Cir. 1975); Byram River v. Port Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972); Virginians
for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (D. Va. 1972).
113. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 108.
114. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee 1I), 451 U.S. 304, 333 (1981).
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found it necessary, in a "few and restricted" instances . . . to
develop federal common law .... It is resorted to "[in] absence of
an applicable Act of Congress," and because the Court is com-
pelled to consider federal questions "which cannot be answered
from federal statutes alone." 15
Ultimately, in Milwaukee 11 the Court developed a two-part
test to determine whether a federal statute displaces a previously
available federal common law action. 116 First, the court must as-
sess the scope of the legislation: is it a comprehensive regulatory
program that leaves no room for any gaps to be filled?" 7 Second,
the court must determine whether the scheme established by Con-
gress sufficiently addresses the problem formerly governed by fed-
eral common law. 8 Thus, in the absence of a preemptive statute,
federal common law applies and preempts state law. As this Com-
ment argues, federal common law applies to the regulation of CO 2.
Not only does the CAA fail to satisfy either prong of the Milwau-
kee H test, but Congress also intentionally left a statutory void
under the Act that federal common law must fill.
2. Applying the Federal Common Law of Public
Nuisance to Environmental Cases
Various academics agree that tort law is, and should be, pre-
served as an appropriate supplement to statutory regulation in
climate change litigation. 1 9 Nuisance law is not only the "com-
115. Id. at 313-14 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 n.7
(1966); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469 (1942)).
116. Id. at 315 n.8.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Professor of Environmental Law, writes that Congress
clearly did not intend for the CAA to regulate CO2. The CAA, therefore, does not
preempt the use of the federal common law of public nuisance. See REITZE, supra note
10, at 415-19. For other discussions upholding this viewpoint, see David. A. Gross-
man, Article, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Liti-
gation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003); Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out
of Parlors: Using Nuisance Law to Affect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENVTL. L. 403
(1997); Eduardo M. Penalver, Article, Acts of God or Toxic Torts? Applying Tort Prin-
ciples to the Problem of Climate Change, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563 (1998); Gerald
Torres, Seventh Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on Environmental Law: Who Owns
the Sky?, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 515 (2002). Adopting a contrary viewpoint, how-
ever, other authors argue that the CAA indeed preempts the use of the federal com-
mon law of public nuisance because CO 2 is a pollutant for CAA purposes and Congress
delegated comprehensive authority to the EPA to regulate CO 2. For discussions up-
holding this contrary viewpoint, see Giovinazzo, supra note 10; Merrill, supra note 94;
Maney, supra note 10; Nicholle Winters, Note, Carbon Dioxide: A Pollutant in the Air,
19
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mon law backbone of modern environmental and energy law," but
it has also enjoyed a "remarkable stasis" throughout centuries in
many areas of decision. 120 Public nuisance law121 is particularly
well-suited for the resolution of many environmental problems. 122
For more than a century, states have exercised police power to
protect their natural resources and environment. In one of the
first cases to apply public nuisance law to abate the discharge of
noxious gases, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes held:
[Georgia] has an interest independent of and behind the titles of
its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the
last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their
forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air .... It is a fair
and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the air
over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by sul-
phurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains ... should
not be further destroyed or threatened. 123
Holmes' proclamation is not limited to environmental injury
within Georgia's borders, but applies to all states and their respec-
tive interests in protecting their orchards, forests, and coastlines.
Because nuisance law is considered a versatile, all-purpose doc-
But is the EPA Correct That it is Not an "Air Pollutant"?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1996
(2004).
120. 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: AIR AND WATER 2, 3 (West
Publishing Co. 1986) ("[I]t has hung on from its horse-and-buggy origins to the days of
high technology.").
121. Public nuisance is "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2) (1979). Public rights in-
clude the public health, public safety, public peace, public comfort, and public conve-
nience. Id. § 821B(2)(a). When a public right is violated, a state or its representative,
or a private individual may seek to protect these rights by asserting an action in pub-
lic nuisance. Id. § 821C cmt. b (a private individual may assert an action in public
nuisance only if that individual has suffered harm different in kind, not just in de-
gree, from the harm suffered by the public). By contrast, private nuisance is a "non-
trespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land."
Id. § 821D. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS interprets the phrase "interest in
the use and enjoyment of land" to generally mean the pleasure and comfort that a
landowner derives from occupying and using land that will not depreciate in value
from any physical invasion. Id. § 821E.
122. Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 291 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The theory of nui-
sance lends itself naturally to combating the harms created by environmental
problems."). For examples of recent environmental nuisance cases, see, e.g., State v.
Clayton, 492 So. 2d 665 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (unauthorized dump); Sterling v. Vel-
sicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (hazardous waste disposal
site); Galaxy Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Massengill, 338 S.E.2d 428 (Ga. 1986) (air pollution,
noise, and vibration from coal-fired burners).
123. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1907).
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trine, 124 "the application of nuisance law to the problem of global
warming . . .does not appear to be so novel an extension." 125
Much like the interstate air pollution dispute in Tennessee Cop-
per, 26 unregulated CO 2 emissions, which travel across state
boundaries and are alleged to cause national environmental in-
jury, arguably create a public nuisance claim under the federal
common law.
Federal common law must remain a viable option, especially
when the President, Congress, the EPA, and the courts have
barred any opportunity for a plaintiff to secure a statutory or ad-
ministrative remedy for the effects of global warming. 127 Only
when Congress passes regulatory global warming legislation
should courts rule that the CAA "occupies the field" of regulating
CO 2 emissions. While the CAA is a very comprehensive stat-
ute, 28 it lacks the language, structure, and practical application
necessary to reasonably regulate CO 2 emissions. Consequently,
regulation is possible under federal common law. Federal courts
have subject matter jurisdiction to hear interstate disputes 29
and, because the regulation of CO 2 is of great federal concern, the
power to employ federal law.' 30 Federal common law is therefore
an appropriate mechanism to fill statutory gaps and impose bind-
ing limitations on CO 2 emissions. The next section underscores
this proposition through analysis of the CAA and a comparison to
the CWA and the Milwaukee If standards for preemption.
124. RODGERS, supra note 120, at 29-30.
125. David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Cli-
mate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 52 (2003).
126. Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. 230.
127. At present, only one district court has concluded that the CAA-in regulating
air pollution, not CO2 specifically-displaces federal common law. See United States
v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699, 702 (D.N.J. 1982) (defendant landfill operator was
releasing vaporized nitric acid and polyvinyl chloride into the air).
128. RODGERS, supra note 120, at 124-25 ("On a spectrum of skimpy to comprehen-
sive . . .the post-1970 environmental statutes are comprehensive, and can be de-
scribed also as contemporary, complex, and complete. The statutes, especially under
an occupation of the field approach, leave few caps to be filled.").
129. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ...
between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States
.... "); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (diversity of citizenship).
130. Field, supra note 98, at 983 (noting that federal law can apply whenever fed-
eral interests require a federal solution); see also Note, The Federal Common Law, 82
HARv. L. REV. 1512, 1524-25 (1969) ("The formulation of remedies by federal courts
does not depend upon affirmative congressional authorization for its validity, but
upon the presence of a federal interest .... ").
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V. THE CLEAN AIR ACT, PREEMPTION, AND THE
REGULATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE
A. Regulatory Void Based on a Textual Analysis of the
Clean Air Act
Congress did not intend for the EPA to regulate CO 2 through
the CAA. In developing the latest amendments, to the CAA in
1990, Congress considered various provisions that would author-
ize the EPA to regulate CO 2 and other GHGs but expressly chose
not to include them in the final version of the Act. Legislative his-
tory indicates that the current Subchapter VI of the CAA, entitled
"Stratospheric Ozone Protection,"'131 is the end product of a failed
attempt to incorporate language addressing global warming. Sen-
ate Bill S. 1630 sought to limit GHGs through the CAA, recogniz-
ing that uncontrolled emissions of C0 2, CFCs, and methane were
contributing to global climate change. 132 In its proposed provision
entitled the "Stratospheric Ozone and Climate Protection Act,"133
S. 1630's goal was to "[eliminate] emissions of manufactured sub-
stances with ozone depleting potential as well as global warming
potential, to reduce to the maximum extent possible emissions of
other greenhouse gases, and to provide for an orderly and equita-
ble shift to safe alternatives." 134
In the House of Representatives, provisions concerning ozone
and climate change were notably absent in the original bill of the
CAA Amendments of 1990, H.R. 3030.135 Representative John D.
Dingell (D-Mich.) introduced language which would protect the
stratospheric ozone as an amendment to H.R. 3030 that made the
House version of the bill similar in scope to the Senate's S.
1630.136 Dingell's amendment, however, did not include any pro-
vision to regulate CO 2.137 When both the House and Senate bills
were combined, final Amendments emerged from the conference
committee with language addressing stratospheric ozone, but all
references to CO 2 and other GHGs, including the "Climate Protec-
131. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7671 (2001).
132. S. 1630, 101st Cong. (1990); S. REP. No. 101-228, at 377 (1989), as reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3760.
133. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 385 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,
3769.
134. Id. at 387, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3770.
135. H.R. 3030, 101st Cong. (1989). This bill was considered destined to be the
primary source of the 1990 Amendments. REITZE, supra note 10, at 415.
136. 136 CONG. REC. 11964 (1990).
137. Id. at 11965.
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tion" portion of Title VII, were removed. 138 Only one reference to
climate change, found in section 602(e) of Subchapter VI, remains:
"One year after [enactment of the CAA Amendments of 1990] ...
and after notice and opportunity for comment, the Administrator
shall publish the global warming potential of each listed sub-
stance."139 Lest the Administrator forget the nonregulatory na-
ture of this provision, the subsequent sentence emphasizes, "The
preceding sentence shall not be construed to be the basis of any
additional regulation under this chapter."'140 Clearly, despite the
Senate's thorough consideration of GHG emissions regulation,
Congress decided that the EPA would not regulate C0 2. As Pro-
fessor Reitze states, "[tihis is strong evidence the Congress did not
intend to regulate GHGs when it considered ozone-depleting sub-
stances and GHGs in the same sections of the pending
legislation."141
Congress' deliberate rejection of CO 2 regulation in Subchapter
VI is not the only occasion when it considered but decided against
using such language. In the original S. 1630, the Senate included
a provision, Section 216, which would require the Administrator
to set emissions standards for carbon dioxide from light duty vehi-
cles.142 The bill authorized the Administrator to determine test
procedures for compliance as well as to assess penalties against
manufacturers who did not meet the average CO 2 emissions re-
quirements. 143 As necessary and practical as this provision
sounds, it was later suppressed in conference committee.' 44 The
current Subchapter II, which governs emission standards for mov-
ing sources, does not include any emissions standards for CO 2
whatsoever.145
138. H.R. REP. No. 101-952, at 335 (1990) (Conf. Rep.).
139. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7671(e) (2000).
140. Id.
141. REITZE, supra note 10, at 416.
142. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 98-99 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,
3483-85. In 1990, motor vehicles produced 25% of CO 2 emissions in the United
States. Id. at 99, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3484. In 2004, the transporta-
tion sector was the largest source of CO 2 emissions, accounting for 33%. The con-
sumption of petroleum products accounted for 98%. In addition, C0 2 emissions from
the transportation sector increased by 3.1% relative to 2003. 2004 REPORT, supra
note 24, at xii.
143. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 100 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,
3485.
144. H.R. REP. No. 101-952, at 336-38 (1990) (Conf. Rep.).
145. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7554.
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Thus, as written, the CAA only addresses CO 2 in the context
of nonregulatory strategies. Section 103(g) directs the Adminis-
trator to "conduct a basic engineering research and technology
program to develop, evaluate, and demonstrate nonregulatory
strategies and technologies for air pollution prevention.... Such
program shall include... [i]mprovements in nonregulatory strate-
gies and technologies for preventing or reducing multiple air pol-
lutants, including.., carbon dioxide." 146 Because section 103(g)
lists CO 2 in addition to criteria air pollutants already regulated,
one could argue that Congress intended for the EPA to regulate
CO 2.147 However, the fact that Congress actually revised section
103(g) to include the phrase "nonregulatory strategies"-a total of
five times in fact-strongly militates against adopting this view-
point. 148 Moreover, section 103(g) concludes that "[n]othing in
this subsection shall be construed to authorize the imposition on
any person of air pollution control requirements." 149 In 1990, a
year in which the United States released 5002.3 million metric
tons of CO 2 into the air,150 it is highly unreasonable that Congress
would have forgotten to include C0 2 in a comprehensive piece of
legislation. 5 1 The deliberate rejection of regulatory language in
concert with the deliberate addition of nonregulatory language
underscores the argument that Congress did not specifically give
EPA authority to regulate C0 2: "Few principles of statutory con-
struction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress
does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has
earlier discarded in favor of other language.' 5 2
Federal common law must provide a remedial scheme until
the CAA is amended or new regulatory CO 2 legislation is passed
because, as evidenced by the legislative history from 1990, Con-
gress only intended for the EPA to develop nonregulatory strate-
146. 42 U.S.C. § 7403(g)(1) (emphasis added).
147. Furthermore, many argue that because section 103(g) names CO2 as a pollu-
tant, then the very broad definition of "air pollutant" in section 302(g) surely covers
CO2. E.g., Maney, supra note 10, at 329-33, 343; Winters, supra note 119, at 2005-06.
For the definition of "air pollutant," see supra note 11.
148. H.R. REP. No. 101-952, at 349 (1990) (Conf. Rep.).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 7403(g)(4).
150. 2004 REPORT, supra note 24, at xi tbl.3.
151. REITZE, supra note 10, at 418.
152. INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987); REITZE, supra note 10,
at 416 ("In the normal case Congress is assumed to be conscious of what it has done,
especially when it chooses between two available terms that might have been in-
cluded in the provision in question." (quoting Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d
113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
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gies to research the effects of CO 2 emissions. Research does not
displace regulation. As one scholar states, "[s]tatutes perceived as
tentative, changing, recommendatory, and suggestive are in con-
siderable need of judicial elaboration. Cutting down on judicial
remedies and cutting back on common law rights interdicts the
flow of empirical information needed for improved legislation. " 153
B. Regulatory Impossibility Based on a Structural
Analysis of the Clean Air Act
In its present form, the CAA is inadequately designed to regu-
late CO 2. The CAA's principal goal is to "protect and enhance the
quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its popula-
tion."154 While regulation of CO 2 fits nicely within the ambits of
the CAA's objective, its mechanisms are ill-suited to reduce CO2
emissions. To achieve the CAA's goal, Congress vested the Ad-
ministrator of the EPA with expansive discretion to designate cri-
teria air pollutants, pollutants that may endanger public health or
welfare and come from numerous mobile or stationary sources.155
CO 2 may reasonably be considered a criteria pollutant. 156 Never-
theless, even if CO 2 were listed as a criteria pollutant under the
current CAA, the Administrator and states would encounter many
problems in regulating it effectively.
First, C0 2 falls outside the scope of the CAA's mechanism to
regulate emissions because the primary effect of CO 2 emissions-
global warming-is not an ambient air problem. 57 Once the Ad-
ministrator lists a criteria pollutant, he or she has a nondiscre-
tionary duty to publish National Ambient Air Quality Standards
("NAAQS"), which specify a target level of pollution to reduce
emissions.' 58 NAAQS are divided into primary and secondary
153. RODGERS, supra note 120, at 121.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1).
155. Id. § 7408(a)(1)(A)-(B).
156. As explained in Section II.B, CO2's effect on global warming is predicted to
affect public welfare negatively and such emissions are released from numerous mo-
bile (e.g., automobile tailpipes) and stationary (e.g., power plants) sources. See supra
text accompanying notes 28-46.
157. See 40 C.F.R. § 50.1(e) (2005) (defining "ambient air" as "that portion of the
atmosphere, external to buildings, to which the general public has access"); see also
Symposium, The Role of State Attorneys General in National Environmental Policy:
Welcome & Global Warming Panel, Part 1, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 335, 341 (2005)
("Carbon dioxide is not an ambient air problem." (quoting Richard Blumenthal, Attor-
ney General of Connecticut)).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a).
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standards. Primary NAAQS are "ambient air quality standards
the attainment and maintenance of which.., are requisite to pro-
tect the public health."15 9 Secondary NAAQS "protect the public
welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated
with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air."160
NAAQS are designed to regulate criteria pollutants that accumu-
late near the surface of the earth and therefore affect ambient air.
By contrast, even though C0 2 initially enters ambient air when
emitted, its effect on global warming occurs much higher in the
atmosphere-in the troposphere and the lower stratosphere. 61
Second, it would be extremely difficult to designate a nonat-
tainment area for CO 2. After NAAQS are established for a pollu-
tant, the Administrator is required to designate nonattainment,
attainment, and unclassifiable areas based on the idea that ambi-
ent concentrations of pollutants differ from region to region.' 62
Because tropospheric concentrations of C0 2 are essentially ho-
mogenous around the world, the goal of delineating a nonattain-
ment area for CO2 is impractical.1 63 C0 2 has a long atmospheric
residence time of up to 200 years, which results in the well-mixed
concentration of CO 2 throughout the atmosphere.164 If NAAQS for
CO 2 were set below present atmospheric concentration, the entire
United States would fall into the nonattainment category, 165 and
it would be unlikely to ever reach attainment unless the entire
world adopted similar emissions standards. 166 Moreover, to
achieve attainment, states are required to adopt a state imple-
mentation plan ("SIP") to enforce primary and secondary NAAQS
159. Id. § 7409(b)(1).
160. Id. § 7409(b)(2). Effects on public welfare include "effects on soils, water,
crops, vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and cli-
mate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, as well
as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and well-being .... " Id.
§ 7602(h).
161. WIGLEY, supra note 28, at 10.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(b).
163. Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, General Counsel, EPA, to Marianne
L. Horinko, Acting Administrator, EPA Region 7 (Aug. 28, 2003) (on file with Pace
Environmental Law Review); see also REITZE, supra note 10, at 417 n.113 (noting that
concentrations are about two parts per million (PPM) higher in the northern hemi-
sphere due to the greater amount of emissions from industrialized nations).
164. CLIMATE CHANGE 2001, supra note 32, at 38 tbl.1.
165. REITZE, supra note 10, at 417.
166. Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, General Counsel, EPA, to Marianne
L. Horinko, Acting Administrator, EPA Region 7 (Aug. 28, 2003) (on file with Pace
Environmental Law Review). The principal irony is that the international commu-
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at the regional level. 167 Any process predicated on achieving re-
gional reductions of a pollutant that is well-mixed throughout the
atmosphere will arguably be ineffective. 168
Third, NAAQS are not aptly designed to regulate CO 2 emis-
sions because the Administrator would be unable to publish pri-
mary NAAQS. This is because, at present concentrations CO 2 is
not directly harmful to human health.169 Based on the informa-
tion about health effects contained in documents compiled under
CAA section 108(a)(2), the EPA is required to "identify the maxi-
mum airborne concentration of a pollutant that the public health
can tolerate, decrease the concentration to provide an 'adequate'
margin of safety, and set the standard at that level."1 70 Because
the atmospheric concentration of CO 2 was 368 ppm in 2000 and is
projected to reach 540-970 ppm in 2100, well below the "safe"
amount of 20,000 ppm, 171 the NAAQS' focus on reducing the con-
centration to a level the public can tolerate does not apply to CO 2.
Therefore, the plain language of the CAA not only reveals a
clear nonregulatory purpose, but the statute's overall design is
also inadequate to regulate CO 2 effectively. Indeed, if the text of
the CAA "is read with a focus on the goal it is intended to achieve,
Congress cannot have intended to regulate global warming using
a program completely unsuited to this purpose.1 72 Because the
effects of global warming present interstate nuisance disputes
that are national in scope, courts should apply federal common
law to resolve these federal issues and help reduce the United
States' impact on the global environment. As stated by the Tenth
Circuit, "[u]ntil the field has been made the subject of comprehen-
sive legislation or authorized administrative standards, only a
167. 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
168. REITZE, supra note 10, at 417 (citing Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246
(1975); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976)).
169. See Canadian Centre for Occupational Health & Safety, Health Effects of Car-
bon Dioxide Gas, http://www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/chemicals/chem-profiles/car-
bondioxide/health cd.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2006) (finding that exposure to CO 2
at levels below 2% (20,000 ppm) is not harmful; persons exposed to concentrations of
3.3% to 5.4% for fifteen minutes evidenced an increased depth of breathing; and at
7.5%, an inability to breathe, increased pulse rate, headache, dizziness, sweating, and
other effects).
170. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001).
171. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: SYNTHESIS REPORT CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUPS I, II, AND III TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 8 (Robert T.
Watson et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001), available at http://www.grida.no/
climate/ipcc-tar/vol4/english/pdf/spm.pdf.
172. REITZE, supra note 10, at 417.
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federal common law basis can provide an adequate means for
dealing with such claims as alleged federal rights."173
C. No Preemption Under City of Milwaukee v. Illinois
To determine whether a federal statute preempts a previously
available common law action, a court may apply the Milwaukee H
test.174 In the regulation of C0 2, it is evident that the CAA does
not satisfy either prong of the Milwaukee 11 test; the CAA is
neither sufficiently comprehensive nor adequately capable of en-
forcing the regulation of CO 2 emissions.
To satisfy the first prong of the Milwaukee H test, the CAA
must be comprehensive in scope, without any interstitial void. In
comparison to the CWA, the CAA is much less comprehensive for
the purposes of Milwaukee H. Courts have recognized that al-
though both the CWA and CAA are very comprehensive statutes, a
fundamental difference exists between them175-the extent of pol-
lution sources regulated under the CAA is much more limited
than in the CWA. Generally speaking, the CAA selectively regu-
lates pollutants and their sources whereas the CWA prohibits the
discharge of any pollutant into navigable waters without, or in vi-
olation of, a permit. 76 In United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., the dis-
trict court acknowledged,
While the [CWA] regulates every point source of water pollution,
the CAA regulates only those stationary sources of air pollution
that are found to threaten national ambient air quality stan-
dards. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that the CAA pre-
empts the federal common law of nuisance simply because the
[CWA] does so. 17 7
173. Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971), cited with approval in
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1), 406 U.S. 91, 103, 107 n.9 (1972).
174. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee I/), 451 U.S. 304, 315 n.8 (1981) (The
Milwaukee H test is: (1) whether the statute is comprehensive and leaves no gaps to
be filled; and (2) whether the statute sufficiently addresses the issue formerly gov-
erned by federal common law).
175. See United States v. Tenn. Air Pollution Control Bd., 185 F.3d 529, 534 (6th
Cir. 1999) (addressing "significant differences between the Clean Water Act and the
Clean Air Act"); New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 n.2 (2d Cir.
1981) (recognizing other distinctions between the CWA and CAA); United States v.
Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D.N.J. 1982) (discussing distinctions between
the CWA and CAA).
176. Compare Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2000), with Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000).
177. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. at 701.
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In addition to the scope of regulated sources, the CWA is more
comprehensive than the CAA because the Supreme Court ex-
pressly closed all statutory gaps in Milwaukee 11.178 While the
CWA preempts all federal common law actions, courts still have
an opportunity to fill the interstices of the CAA. Even if the Su-
preme Court were to hold that the CAA occupies the field of air
pollution and preempts federal common law, this ruling would be
inapplicable to the regulation of C0 2, since the CAA does not regu-
late CO 2 nor is it adequately designed to achieve significant reduc-
tions in atmospheric concentration of CO 2. Until Congress speaks
to the issue of enforceable limits on CO 2 emissions, the CAA can-
not be considered sufficiently comprehensive because there will al-
ways be a regulatory and remedial void in the statute.
To satisfy the second prong of the Milwaukee II test, the regu-
latory scheme of the CAA must sufficiently address any issues of
CO 2 regulation previously governed by federal common law.179
Actions in federal common law nuisance have existed in air pollu-
tion cases concurrently with the CAA.180 Even prior to the pas-
sage of the CAA, common law nuisance actions have traditionally
governed transboundary air pollution cases. 18' Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that interstate disputes concerning the
harmful effects of CO 2 emissions create a strong enough federal
interest to employ federal common law. Professor Thomas Merrill
of Columbia University Law School agrees:
178. Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. at 317 ("The establishment of such a self-consciously
comprehensive program by Congress, which certainly did not exist when Illinois v.
Milwaukee was decided, strongly suggests that there is no room for courts to attempt
to improve on that program with federal common law.").
179. Id. at 315 n.8. No court has decided this issue yet. Though the appeal of
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) will hopefully
produce an opinion on the issue.
180. E.g., Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979) (federal common law of nuisance not precluded by CAA);
United States v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 478 F. Supp. 1215 (D. Mont. 1979) (CAA does
not preclude the federal common law of nuisance).
181. E.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (sulfur dioxide emis-
sions enjoined because injurious to environment); Am. Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Godfrey,
158 F. 225 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 207 U.S. 597 (1907) (sulfur dioxide emitted from ore
smelter smokestacks enjoined because injurious to health, animals, and vegetation);
McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 F. 951 (D. Utah 1904) (sulfur dioxide
emissions enjoined, even though damage incurred was relatively small). But see Re-
serve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), modified on other grounds, 529
F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976) (federal common law of nuisance not available as a basis for
relief where there is no allegation or evidence of any interstate health hazards).
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Public nuisance suits brought by [Attorneys General] challeng-
ing transboundary air pollution were understood to be subject to
federal common law before the [CAA] was adopted. Hence, the
failure to regulate a particular type of transboundary pollution
. . . should be construed to mean Congress would have wanted
federal common law to continue to apply.' 8 2
Moreover, because there is a strong federal interest in the trans-
boundary emission and regulation of C0 2, courts should apply a
federal rule of decision in a global warming case. The national
scope of the issue underscores the importance of employing federal
common law; federal courts are competent to act on interstate
public nuisance claims, and there is an important federal issue at
stake. When Congress developed the CAA, it wrote a very com-
prehensive piece of legislation but expressly left out provisions for
the regulation of CO 2 although the Act mentions CO2 and ac-
knowledges global warming.'8 3 Accordingly, the CAA's clear
nonregulatory focus coupled with the absence of legal remedies
should not displace actions in federal common law when federal
rights are violated. Congress' conscious choice to reject specific
regulatory language that would limit a widely pervasive pollutant
warrants the inference that Congress intended for federal com-
mon law nuisance claims to remain viable.' 84
D. Fashioning an Equitable Remedy
The principle of equity is rooted in the ancient maxim ubi jus
ibi remedium, which reminds us that where the law gives a right,
it also gives a remedy.'8 5 As a general matter, the assertion that
there can be no right without a remedy is not always true.'8 6
Nonetheless, the doctrine of equity continues to play a significant
role in the American legal system. Various treatises on equity
note, "[e]quity 'does not create rights which the common law de-
182. Merrill, supra note 94, at 313.
183. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7403(g) (research and evaluate C0 2), 7671a(e) (re-
port global warming potential for listed substances) (2000).
184. Watson v. Sutherland, 72 U.S. 74, 78 (1867) (stating that where a statute does
not provide an adequate remedy at law, a plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief).
185. Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., 29 F. Cas. 506, 508 (C.C.D. Me. 1838) (No. 17,322)
("If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and main-
tain it, and a remedy, if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and, indeed, it
is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for want of right and want of
remedy are reciprocal." (quoting Lord Holt)).
186. One example is that citizens cannot sue any state in federal court. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Additionally, any applicable statute
of limitations that has run will extinguish a person's right to seek relief.
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nies; but it gives effectual redress for the infringement of existing
rights, where, by reason of the special circumstances of the case,
the redress at law would be inadequate."'187
The United States inherited its equity jurisprudence from the
English courts of Chancery,188 but it derives its equitable jurisdic-
tion wholly from the United States Constitution and statutes18 9
As Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states, "[the judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority... ."190 To
administer the principles of equity and justice, Chancery courts
were established because the tenacity of common-law procedure
precluded common-law tribunals from vindicating such rights. 191
Common-law tribunals could not grant conditional relief nor could
they prohibit or forbid a defendant from doing something; only
damages were awarded as relief.192 Moreover, common-law tribu-
nals were unlikely to stray from precedent, even when entirely
new circumstances warranted a different remedy. 193 Equity
courts were therefore able to fashion the appropriate remedy
when legal rights were violated. As stated by the Fourth Circuit,
"[o]ne of the glories of equity jurisprudence is that it is not bound
by the strict rules of the common law, but can mold its decrees to
do justice amid all the vicissitudes and intricacies of life."'1 94
187. 1 JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 181 n.11 (5th ed.
1941) (quoting ADAMs' EQUITY, INTRODUCTION 9 (6th ed.)).
188. See Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939) ("The
'jurisdiction' thus conferred on the federal courts to entertain suits in equity is an
authority to administer in equity suits the principles of the system of judicial reme-
dies which had been devised and was being administered by the English Court of
Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries.").
189. See POMEROY, supra note 187, at 676.
190. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
191. See POMEROY, supra note 187, at 36 ("[T]he attitude of the [common-law]
courts [ I rendered necessary a separate tribunal with an equitable jurisdiction, and a
procedure capable of being adapted to a variety of circumstances, and of awarding a
variety of special remedies.").
192. Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforce-
ment of Rights in Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 668 (1987).
193. Id.; see also POMEROY, supra note 187, at 22 ("English common-law judges...
set themselves with an iron determination against any modification of the doctrines
and rules once established by precedent, any relaxation of the settled methods which
made the rights of suitors to depend upon the strictest observance of the most arbi-
trary and technical forms, [and] any introduction of new principles which should
bring the law as a whole into a complete harmony with justice and equity.").
194. Bowen v. Hockley, 71 F.2d 781, 786 (4th Cir. 1934); see also POMEROY, supra
note 187, at 78 ("[T]here is no limit to the various forms and kinds of specific remedy
31
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The controlling question remains: When is equity jurisdiction
appropriate? In order to provide equitable relief, district courts
must first determine that no legal remedy is adequate and that
the plaintiff will experience irreparable injury.195 The CAA is in-
capable of providing a legal remedy to regulate C0 2; thus, the
statute fails to adequately redress a sovereign's right to be free
from public nuisances. Nowhere in the CAA's regulatory scheme
lies a plain, adequate, practical, and efficient remedy at law to
achieve binding controls on CO 2 emissions. Therefore, redressing
the public nuisance created by the effects of C0 2 emissions makes
an excellent case for equitable relief, especially because the regu-
lation of CO 2 is a matter of public interest. 196 Much like in the
field of water pollution where, in the absence of a comprehensive
statute, the Supreme Court originally sanctioned a court's equita-
ble resolution of public nuisance suits, 1 97 so too should a federal
court exercise its equitable jurisdiction in the field of carbon diox-
ide regulation. As stated by the Seventh Circuit, "statutory reme-
dies which do not afford aggrieved parties at least a reasonable
facsimile of the relief sought under federal common law do not
preclude federal common law remedies."198 In many public nui-
which [a court] may grant, adapted to novel conditions of right and obligation, which
are constantly arising from the movements of society.").
195. See High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 641-42 (9th Cir.
2004). Various courts have held that irreparable injury may consist of the absence of
an adequate remedy at law. See Superior Oil Co. v. Transco Energy Co., 616 F. Supp.
94, 96 (D. La. 1984) (citing Placid Oil Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 491 F. Supp. 895 (D.
Tex. 1980)); Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452 (1973).
196. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) ("Unless otherwise
provided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court are availa-
ble for the proper and complete exercise of that jurisdiction. And since the public
interest is involved in a proceeding of this nature, those equitable powers assume an
even broader and more flexible character than when only a private controversy is at
stake. Power is thereby resident in the District Court, in exercising this jurisdiction,
'to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case."') (em-
phasis added).
197. The court in Milwaukee I acknowledged that "federal courts will be empow-
ered to appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by
water pollution." Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1), 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
"Until the field has been made the subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized
administrative standards, only a federal common law basis can provide an adequate
means for dealing with such claims as alleged federal rights." Id. at 107 n.9.
198. Barany v. Buller, 670 F.2d 726, 736 (7th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). Schol-
arly opinion agrees. See Pawa & Krass, supra note 10, at 460 ("'Federal common law
should continue to provide the rule of decision in cases falling within these gaps.'"
(quoting Kenneth M. Murchison, Interstate Pollution: The Need for Federal Common
Law, 6 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 36 (1986)); see also Robert L. Glicksman, Federal
Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 171
(1985).
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sance suits in the field of air pollution, courts commonly order a
facility to reduce its emissions of the particular air pollutant.199
Thus, it is not unreasonable for a court to order the same with
respect to anthropogenic sources of CO 2.
VI. CONCLUSION
Global warming is a documented environmental problem at
the forefront of our nation's environmental policy, yet the federal
government has not committed to reducing CO 2 emissions through
binding legislation. Our physical and biological environments are
likely to suffer grave consequences if CO 2 emissions are not sub-
stantially capped. Federal inaction coupled with the inadequacy
of the CAA as a regulatory and remedial mechanism will not miti-
gate this threat. Therefore, federal common law, unrestricted
from preemptive control, should fill the statutory void. In United
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., Chief Justice Burger
declared,
[T]he inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation
means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibil-
ity of the federal courts. "At the very least, effective Constitu-
tionalism requires recognition of power in the federal courts to
declare, as a matter of common law or judicial legislation,' rules
which may be necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise ef-
fectuate the statutory patterns enacted in the large by
Congress." 200
Public nuisance law is an excellent supplement to the CAA's
nonregulatory scope concerning CO 2. A strong advocate for nui-
sance law, Professor William Rodgers, contends that "[n]uisance
law is uniquely able to assimilate and put to use contemporary
administrative law requirements without being diverted from the
199. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (enjoining emis-
sions of sulfur dioxide); United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.
1970) (enjoining malodorous air pollutants); Am. Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Godfrey, 158
F. 225 (8th Cir. 1907) (same); Ouellette v. Int'l Paper Co., 666 F. Supp. 58 (D. Vt.
1987) (equitable remedy to enjoin emissions from paper mill is available); Galaxy Car-
pet Mills, Inc. v. Massengill, 338 S.E.2d 428 (Ga. 1986) (enjoining air pollution, noise,
and vibration from coal-fired burners); Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523
(Ala. 1979) (enjoining emissions of lead particulates).
200. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)
(quoting Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discre-
tion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 800
(1957)).
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basic job of doing justice between the parties."20 1 Actions in public
nuisance to abate interstate air pollution problems have existed
for a century; actions in public nuisance for the interstate harms
caused by the effects of CO 2 emissions should be treated no differ-
ently. Especially where the typical form of injunctive relief in an
environmental case imposes caps on pollutant emissions, 20 2 the
regulation of CO 2 in order to prevent or slow global warming is
particularly well-matched for the federal common law of public
nuisance. Public nuisance is an injury, which carries a right de-
serving of a remedy. Because federal common law provides an
available remedy, it cannot be displaced with a regulatory
vacuum.
201. RODGERS, supra note 120, at 29.
202. Id. at 115 ("Routinely, the courts combine technological and operational
limitations.").
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